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I. INTRODUCTION 
At first glance, Tuol Sleng is like any other school in one of Phnom 
Penh’s quiet neighborhoods. Open-aired walkways connect classrooms 
and benches line sidewalks where children once played. Yet, to museum 
visitors, the legacy of the Khmer Rouge quickly becomes apparent. 
Barbed wire lines every entrance, and exercise equipment once used to 
torture victims still stands in the small courtyard. In former classrooms, 
blood stains the floor of prison cells, where metal rods and chains used to 
inflict terror lie untouched, as if it was only days ago that Khmer Rouge 
soldiers fled upon the invasion of Vietnamese troops.1 
Tuol Sleng, called S-21 when it was converted into a Khmer Rouge 
detention center, was but one security center of the Khmer Rouge regime 
that seized control of Cambodia on April 17, 1975.2 In the four years that 
followed, an estimated two million Cambodians perished under the radi-
cal communist state of Democratic Kampuchea (DK).3 In an effort to 
transform the country into a classless society void of money and private 
property, the Khmer Rouge evacuated city dwelling “new people” to the 
countryside, where they were forced to adopt the infamous black cloth-
                                                     
∗ J.D. Candidate, Seattle University School of Law, 2012; B.A., Hampshire College, 2006. I thank 
Youk Chhang, John Ciorciari, Anne Heindel, and the wonderful staff at the Documentation Center 
of Cambodia for their assistance with this Comment. 
 1. See DAVID P. CHANDLER, VOICES FROM S-21: TERROR AND HISTORY IN POL POT’S SECRET 
PRISON 36 (1999). 
 2. DAVID P. CHANDLER, BROTHER NUMBER ONE: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY OF POL POT 1 
(rev. ed. 1999). 
 3. DAVID P. CHANDLER, A HISTORY OF CAMBODIA 212 (3d ed. 2000). The precise number of 
Cambodians who were killed during the Khmer Rouge is unknown, and death estimates range from 
1.7 to 3 million. E.g., BEN KIERNAN, THE POL POT REGIME: RACE, POWER, AND GENOCIDE UNDER 
THE KHMER ROUGE, 1975–79 ix (3d ed. 2009); Introduction to the ECCC: Summary, ECCC, 
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/about-eccc/ (last visited June 26, 2011). 
266 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 35:265 
ing of the regime and labor in the rice fields.4 “Angkar Padevat,” the 
anonymous DK government, demanded fierce loyalty—Khmer Rouge 
cadres executed intellectuals, past government officials, and other sus-
pected traitors without hesitation.5 
Inside the walls of S-21 prison, an estimated 14,000 people6 were 
tortured and killed under the command of Duch, the prison’s infamous 
leader.7 Thirty-one years later, in July 2010, Duch was found guilty in 
Case 001 before the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
(ECCC),8 a hybrid United Nations and Cambodian-run tribunal estab-
lished to prosecute the high-ranking Khmer Rouge officials most respon-
sible for the horrific crimes that impacted nearly every Cambodian.9 
Though Cambodians waited over thirty years for justice, during the 
judicial investigation, the public was largely deprived of information re-
lated to the ECCC’s case. In 2008, Duch’s return to Tuol Sleng and the 
Killing Fields—a mass grave in a remote area outside Phnom Penh—as 
part of the judicial investigation drew widespread attention.10 Both the 
public and members of the media arrived in large numbers to witness the 
historical event. Yet, upon arrival, reporters were stopped by antiriot po-
lice, who guarded the premises with AK-47s and barricaded the streets.11 
The ECCC Co-Investigating Judges forbade members of the press and 
others from observing the events and ordered that Tuol Sleng be closed 
to the public.12 Those reporters who managed to get close to the event 
were warned by tribunal officials that if information appeared in the local 
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media, those responsible would be blacklisted from the court.13 Police 
questioned reporters for hours, destroyed photos, and warned about the 
dangers of breaching the confidential judicial investigation.14 
But Tuol Sleng is now a museum open to the public, where visitors 
are free to roam the halls and encouraged to learn more about Cambo-
dia’s dark history15 and Duch, a notorious man whose identity was far 
from secret at the time of the investigation.16 Why the media was totally 
excluded is uncertain, for the judges gave no clear reasoning for the clo-
sures.17 
The restrictive media access at the Tuol Sleng visit was not an iso-
lated event, but only one instance in a series where the ECCC has re-
stricted public information and shrouded the court in secrecy. Yet, 
beyond bringing senior leaders of the Khmer Rouge to justice, the 
ECCC, operating as a unique hybrid court, has two broad goals that high-
light the importance of public participation and investment in the tribun-
al: (1) to serve as a means of national reconciliation for the Cambodian 
people,18 and (2) to serve as a model for the domestic Cambodian legal 
system.19 The public’s lack of information regarding the tribunal’s pro-
ceedings threatens to hinder the ECCC from achieving its objectives, and 
the court may leave a legacy of corruption rather than one of justice. 
The ECCC’s strict presumption of confidentiality during pretrial 
investigations serves not only as a barrier to achieving justice but also to 
decrease public investment in the tribunal. ECCC officials have increa-
singly threatened to sanction journalists for publication of confidential 
information pursuant to ECCC Internal Rule 35, a provision that allows 
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for those who “interfere with the administration of justice” to be discip-
lined.20 The threats to journalists who publicize the latest ECCC devel-
opments have sparked criticism of the court by the press, nonprofit 
community, and others.21 And the lack of media access to information 
sets a dangerous precedent for the Kingdom of Cambodia, one of the 
most corrupt countries in the world,22 where freedom of the press is se-
verely limited and domestic laws of defamation and disinformation are 
frequently used to target journalists.23 
Allegations of the media’s interference at international courts are 
not unique, for international criminal tribunals have prosecuted several 
journalists in contempt proceedings.24 Yet, what is unique is the ECCC’s 
foundation in principles of civil law and its jurisdiction to prosecute 
crimes that occurred in the early 1970s.25 Unlike common law courts that 
use express confidentiality orders, the ECCC presumes all aspects of pre-
trial investigations to be confidential, even information that is already in 
the public domain.26 As a result, journalists, who may be unaware that 
the information they divulge is protected, are bound by a duty of confi-
dentiality absent an express court order. These strict presumptions of pri-
vacy—coupled with a broad duty of confidentiality and vague standards 
regarding the use of sanctions pursuant to ECCC Internal Rule 35—are 
problematic for a court like the ECCC, in which the public is highly in-
vested. 
With the sanctioning of journalists in Cambodia becoming a real 
possibility, this Comment advocates that the ECCC depart from the most 
recent contempt jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
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Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)27—which requires neither specific intent nor 
a material interference with the administration of justice to warrant sanc-
tions—and instead develop a test similar to that used by the European 
Court of Human Rights, in which infringements on freedom of expres-
sion must be legitimate, necessary, and proportionate.28 
Part II of this Comment explains the ECCC’s presumption of confi-
dentiality and restrictions on media access to date, while Part III reviews 
the most recent contempt jurisprudence from the ICTY. Part IV explains 
the standard established by the European Court of Human Rights, in 
which restrictions on freedom of expression must be necessary and pro-
portionate to a legitimate purpose before journalists’ freedom of expres-
sion can be infringed during confidential judicial investigations. Part V 
proposes a series of recommendations for the use of sanctions against 
journalists at the ECCC. In order to achieve the court’s objectives of fa-
cilitating national reconciliation and serving as a model for Cambodia’s 
struggling justice system, the final sections conclude that the ECCC 
should first make clear what information is protected by confidentiality 
orders; second, issue clear warnings when those orders are violated; and 
third, evaluate the use of sanctions on a case-by-case basis that considers 
the materiality of the interference, the importance of the confidentiality 
measure, and the intent of the accused. 
II. THE PRESUMPTION OF CONFIDENTIALITY AND MEDIA ACCESS 
AT THE ECCC 
While the three major sources of law governing the tribunal—the 
U.N. Framework Agreement, ECCC Law, and ECCC Internal Rules—all 
convey a desire for strong protection of public access to tribunal pro-
ceedings, they also include express provisions for confidentiality during 
pretrial investigations. Section A provides a brief overview of the ECCC 
and those provisions that protect public access, while section B summa-
rizes confidentiality provisions during the pretrial period. Section C high-
lights the tension between public access and confidential investigations 
through a review of media access in Cambodia and the treatment of jour-
nalists covering the ECCC, and ends with an analysis of the most recent 
ECCC jurisprudence regarding the use of sanctions. 
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A. A Hybrid Court to Serve as a Means of National Reconciliation and 
Model for the Kingdom of Cambodia 
The ECCC is the product of arduous negotiations between the 
Kingdom of Cambodia and the United Nations.29 After much debate re-
garding the structure of the court, its optimal location, the limited scope 
of its jurisdiction, and the composition of court staff, the ECCC was es-
tablished as a hybrid tribunal.30 Rather than function as an ad hoc United 
Nations court, the ECCC was established within the Cambodian domes-
tic legal system, yet it invites foreign participation and guidance though 
its internationalized nature.31 
The tribunal’s procedure must be in accordance with Cambodian 
procedural law, but the Framework Agreement provides that where 
Cambodian law does not address a particular matter, where there is un-
certainty in Cambodian law, or where Cambodian law is inconsistent 
“with international standards, guidance may also be sought in procedural 
rules established at the international level.”32 Prior to the adoption of the 
Cambodian Code of Criminal Procedure (CPC) in August 2007, the 
ECCC promulgated the “Internal Rules” under their implicit rulemaking 
power.33 The Internal Rules are thus “the primary instrument to which 
reference should be made in determining procedures before the ECCC 
where there is a difference between the procedures in the Internal Rules 
and the CPC.”34 
Hybrid courts like the ECCC aim “to marry the best of two 
worlds—the expertise of the international community with the legitimacy 
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of local actors.”35 Negotiators adopted the unique hybrid structure of the 
ECCC not only to facilitate the tribunal’s goal of bringing former senior 
leaders of the Khmer Rouge to justice but also to further two essential 
functions of the ECCC: to serve as a means of national reconciliation,36 
and to serve as a model for the domestic Cambodian legal system.37 
1. A Hybrid Court to Facilitate National Reconciliation 
One of the ECCC’s central goals is to facilitate national reconcilia-
tion for the Cambodian people through its truth-seeking function.38 It has 
been argued that hybrid tribunals have great potential to produce a near 
complete historical record because trials are conducted in the country 
where the crimes occurred, evidence is easier to obtain, and the local 
population has greater access to court proceedings.39 The creation of an 
accurate historical record is an important interest for the Kingdom of 
Cambodia, for despite the large number of Khmer Rouge victims and the 
legacy of violence left in the wake of the killings, the public knows very 
little about the Khmer Rouge government and its motivations for inflict-
ing widespread violence.40 Moreover, what survivors recall of the na-
tion’s dark history is seldom discussed due to cultural norms, and until 
recently, Cambodian schoolchildren received little instruction on Khmer 
Rouge history.41 
The ECCC both expressly and implicitly recognizes the importance 
of national reconciliation. Both the ECCC Internal Rules preamble and 
the Framework Agreement recitals specifically “recognize the legitimate 
concern of the government and the people of Cambodia in the pursuit 
of . . . national reconciliation.”42 Specific provisions for transparency and 
the presence of the ECCC in Phnom Penh further the realization of na-
tional reconciliation. Fundamental principles of the ECCC, established in 
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Internal Rule 21, require that applicable laws be interpreted “so as to en-
sure legal certainty and transparency in proceedings” whenever possi-
ble.43 Moreover, the ECCC’s location in Phnom Penh facilitates national 
reconciliation by affording greater court access to the Cambodian people. 
While ad hoc international tribunals, such as the ICTY, are often inac-
cessible to the very individuals for whom they were established, hybrid 
tribunals are not geographically removed from victimized populations.44 
The ECCC provision that “[t]he Extraordinary Chambers established in 
the trial court and the Supreme Court Chamber shall be located in Phnom 
Penh”45 thus facilitates the inclusion of civil parties, concerned citizens, 
and local schools in tribunal proceedings.46 
2. A Hybrid Court to Serve as a Model for the Domestic Judiciary 
A second objective of the ECCC is to strengthen the domestic 
Cambodian legal system and to “provide a new role model for court op-
erations in Cambodia.”47 The unique hybrid structure of the court estab-
lishes the ECCC within the Cambodian court system and also integrates 
international cooperation in court proceedings.48 The structure protects 
the Cambodian government’s autonomy and seeks to ensure that objec-
tive and impartial proceedings meet international standards of justice.49 
Domestic prosecution of former Khmer Rouge leaders is important to 
assure Cambodians that the judiciary and legal system is “stable, trust-
worthy, competent, credible, and reliable.”50 
In establishing the court to prosecute former Khmer Rouge offi-
cials, “Cambodia invited international participation due to the weakness 
of the Cambodian legal system and the internationalized nature of the 
crimes, and to help in meeting international standards of justice.”51 The 
educative effect of the ECCC is important not only for the people of 
Cambodia but also for the Cambodian judiciary.52 During the reign of the 
Khmer Rouge, the DK government nearly eradicated the judicial system 
by dismantling existing laws, killing attorneys, and destroying legal 
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 44. David Cohen, “Hybrid” Justice in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Cambodia: “Lessons 
Learned” and Prospects for the Future, 43 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 5 (2007). 
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records.53 Following the Khmer Rouge era, an estimated ten law gra-
duates, including five judges, survived and remained in the country.54 
Years later, the Cambodian legal system still lacked resources, expertise, 
and experience.55 Today, the ECCC offers a unique opportunity to alle-
viate some of the key shortcomings of the Cambodian justice system 
identified by the United Nations prior to the establishment of the ECCC 
as “a trained cadre of judges, lawyers and investigators; adequate infra-
structure; and a culture of respect for due process.”56 
The function of the ECCC as a model is apparent in its composition 
of lawyers, in which both international and Cambodian individuals make 
up teams of Co-Investigating Judges57 and Co-Prosecutors,58 and both 
Cambodian and international attorneys comprise defense teams.59 In ad-
dition, both Cambodian and international judges comprise the Pre-Trial 
Chamber, Trial Chamber, and Supreme Court Chamber.60 The rationale 
behind international teams is that expertise will be transferred to Cambo-
dian court staff,61 and that through transparent proceedings, both legal 
practitioners and the Cambodian people will develop a greater under-
standing of the Cambodian justice system. Such side-by-side working 
arrangements have been recognized as one of the unique benefits of hy-
brid tribunals.62 These broader objectives of the ECCC—to serve as a 
means of national reconciliation and as a model for domestic Cambodian 
courts—must be balanced with the need to provide for confidential judi-
cial investigations.63 
B. The Presumption of Confidentiality During Pretrial 
Investigations at the ECCC 
Pretrial proceedings at the ECCC operate under a presumption of 
confidentiality, enforced through Internal Rules that explicitly protect the 
secrecy of the investigation and require that hearings be conducted in 
                                                     
 53. Suzannah Linton, Putting Cambodia’s Extraordinary Chambers into Context, 11 SING. Y.B 
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 54. Id. at 199. 
 55. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia Established Pur-
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 56. Id. ¶ 126. 
 57. ECCC Law, supra note 9, art. 23 (new). 
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 60. ECCC Law, supra note 9, art. 9 (new). 
 61. See Ciorciari, supra note 29, at 20. 
 62. Dickinson, supra note 31, at 307. 
 63. See ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 18, r. 21; ECCC Practice Direction on Classification 
and Management of Case-Related Information, art. 1.2 (amended June 5, 2009) [hereinafter ECCC 
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camera, absent a compelling reason for public access. Further directives 
governing the court establish that the duty of confidentiality applies 
broadly and is not limited to ECCC staff. The result is journalists’ great 
uncertainty regarding what information is private and what is protected. 
1. Judicial Investigations 
Both the ECCC and the domestic Cambodian legal system are 
modeled after the French civil system, in which investigating judges 
conduct private investigations.64 Pursuant to ECCC Internal Rules, Co-
Prosecutors file an introductory submission that outlines the boundaries 
of the investigation,65 and the Co-Investigating Judges are prohibited 
from investigating any matters not enumerated in the submissions of the 
Co-Prosecutors.66 The Co-Investigating Judges are then to collect both 
inculpatory and exculpatory evidence, and defense teams are prohibited 
from conducting their own investigations; however, defense counsel are 
permitted to submit investigative requests to the Co-Investigating 
Judges.67 At the end of the investigation, Co-Investigating Judges issue a 
closing order, the equivalent of an indictment in a common law system.68 
During the judicial investigation, the ECCC Pre-Trial Chamber has 
jurisdiction to settle disagreements between the Co-Prosecutors and be-
tween the Co-Investigating Judges, as well as jurisdiction to hear appeals 
against decisions of the Co-Investigating Judges.69 Like the Trial Cham-
ber, the Pre-Trial Chamber is comprised of five judges—three Cambo-
dian and two international.70 
2. The Scope of Confidential Judicial Investigations 
The investigations conducted by the Co-Investigating Judges are 
presumed to be confidential in order to ensure the quality of the judicial 
process.71 ECCC Internal Rule 56 states that “[i]n order to preserve the 
rights and interests of the parties, judicial investigations shall not be con-
ducted in public. All persons participating in the judicial investigation 
                                                     
 64. See Framework Agreement, supra note 9, art. 5; Linton, supra note 53, at 252–56. 
 65. ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 18, r. 53. 
 66. Id. r. 55. 
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 69. Id. r. 71, 72, 73. 
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shall maintain confidentiality.”72 In addition, ECCC Internal Rules estab-
lish a presumption that pretrial hearings are to be held in camera.73 The 
Office of the Co-Investigating Judges consistently cites three specific 
reasons to protect the privacy of investigations: the guarantee of the pro-
tection of privacy of those persons mentioned in the case file; the pre-
sumption of innocence; and efficiency and effectiveness in investiga-
tions.74 
ECCC Practice Directions provide three categories of classification: 
public, confidential, and strictly confidential. In determining the appro-
priate classifications of filings before the court, the Practice Directions 
suggest balancing several factors: 
The principle underlying this Practice Direction is the need to bal-
ance the confidentiality of the judicial investigations and of other 
parts of judicial proceedings which are not open to the public with 
the need to ensure transparency of public proceedings and to meet 
the purposes of education and legacy.75 
The presumption of confidentiality applies to all aspects of the judi-
cial investigation, and evidence is protected regardless of its content or 
whether the information is already in the public domain.76 Although the 
Internal Rules grant the Co-Investigating Judges discretion to release 
information when it is essential to keep the public involved or to grant 
media access in exceptional circumstances,77 the court has been unclear 
in its reasoning regarding the release of public information.78 The Prac-
tice Directions enumerate those documents that are “in principle” confi-
dential and strictly confidential,79 yet the only guidance provided for the 
                                                     
 72. ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 18, r. 56. 
 73. ECCC Internal Rule 77 states in part that “[h]earings of the Pre-Trial Chamber shall be 
conducted in camera.” ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 18, r. 77. 
 74. Press Release, supra note 71. 
 75. ECCC Practice Direction, supra note 63, art. 1.2. As in the ECCC Internal Rules, the Prac-
tice Direction thus acknowledges that the purpose of the tribunal to serve as a means of national 
reconciliation by ensuring education and legacy is an integral component of the ECCC’s truth-
seeking function. But the Practice Direction provides little support in how such classifications ought 
to be determined. 
 76. Directive on Classification of Pre-Trial Chamber Documents, Case No. 002/07-07-2010-
ECCC/PTC10, ¶ 5 (Pre-Trial Chamber Sept. 9, 2010). Article 5.2 of the Practice Direction specifi-
cally states, “The fact that specific evidence is being considered by the Co-Investigating Judges as 
part of the investigation, irrespective of the content of such evidence, is confidential information.” 
ECCC Practice Direction, supra note 63, art. 5.2. 
 77. ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 18, r. 56(2). 
 78. Krista Nelson, The Presumption of Confidentiality at the ECCC: The Need for Standards to 
Protect Private Investigations, Provide Consistent Public Access, and Increase Transparency, 
SEARCHING FOR THE TRUTH, Fourth Quarter 2010, at 38, http://www.dccam.org/Projects/Magazines/ 
Image_Eng/pdf/4th_Quarter_2010.pdf. 
 79. ECCC Practice Direction, supra note 63, art. 4, 5, 6. 
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classification of public documents is that items “classified as public by 
the Co-Investigating Judges,”80 or documents “after a decision by the 
Pre-Trial Chamber that the document is public,”81 are presumed to be 
public. Filing parties are to propose the appropriate level of classification 
according to the Practice Direction,82 but they are often reminded by the 
Co-Investigating Judges that their classifications are just that—
proposals.83 The Co-Investigating Judges and Pre-Trial Chamber have 
the ultimate discretion as to the appropriate level of classification for 
those documents filed at the ECCC.84 
The Pre-Trial Chamber recently responded to public criticism for 
the lack of standards governing the presumption of confidentiality and 
enumerated six factors for the court to consider when making classifica-
tion determinations.85 The factors include (1) the interests of justice; (2) 
the integrity of the preliminary investigation and the judicial investiga-
tion; (3) fair trial rights; (4) public order; (5) transparency; and (6) any 
protective measures authorized by the court.86 While these factors pro-
vide additional guidance regarding what information the Co-
Investigating Judges or Pre-Trial Chamber ought to consider, they do not 
provide a definitive standard regarding what type of material is pro-
tected. In the absence of further guidance, ECCC jurisprudence suggests 
that unless a document is found on the ECCC website, it is to be pre-
sumed confidential.87 
3. The Duty of Confidentiality 
Despite the lack of guidance regarding the contours of the presump-
tion of confidentiality, the Practice Directions broadly define the scope 
of those bound by the duty: 
                                                     
 80. Id. art. 4(a). 
 81. Id. art. 4(f). 
 82. Id. art. 3.1. 
 83. Directive on Classification of Pre-Trial Chamber Documents, Case No. 002/07-07-2010-
ECCC/PTC10, ¶ 4 (Pre-Trial Chamber Sept. 9, 2010). 
 84. See, e.g., id. ¶ 7. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See Order on the Breach of Confidentiality of the Judicial Investigation, Case No. 002/14-
08-2006 (ECCC Office of the Co-Investigating Judges Mar. 3, 2009). In July 2009, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber affirmed the Co-Investigating Judges’ use of sanctions for breaches of confidentiality when 
it held that by “proceeding to publish in their website case file documents without first seeking the 
approval of the relevant judicial authority for each document, [Ieng Sary defence counsel] acted in 
defiance of the general rule of confidentiality of investigations . . . .” See also Decision on Admissi-
bility on “Appeal Against the Co-Investigating Judges’ Order on Breach of Confidentiality of the 
Judicial Investigation,” Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC18), ¶ 43 (Pre-Trial Chamber 
July 13, 2009). 
2011] Protecting Confidential Investigations or Gagging the Press? 277 
All persons having access to confidential or strictly confidential in-
formation are under a duty of confidentiality. They shall not dis-
close such information to any person, except in accordance with this 
Practice Direction. Further, they shall not act in a manner which 
would lead to unauthorised disclosure of any confidential or strictly 
confidential information.88 
The express definitions of “authorised court staff”89 and “court”90 in the 
Practice Direction, and their omission in the provision outlining the duty 
of confidentiality, suggest that “all those having access” to protected in-
formation is not limited to ECCC personnel or court staff.91 The absence 
of any qualification to “access” further suggests that one need only be 
exposed to confidential information to be bound by the duty, regardless 
of whether he or she knows the information is privileged. 
The absence of clear standards governing the classification of in-
formation during the pretrial investigation, coupled with the broad scope 
of those bound under the duty of confidentiality, is problematic consider-
ing the tribunal’s objective to keep the public informed. Given the ab-
sence of standards regarding public information, individuals exposed to 
information that may be part of the judicial investigation have little guid-
ance as to whether the information is protected. 
The presumption that all information is confidential, even that 
which is widely known to the public, hinders the ECCC’s achievement of 
its objectives discussed in section A—to encourage national reconcilia-
tion and to serve as a model of the Cambodian judicial system—because 
its effect is to dissuade many individuals from publicly discussing court 
proceedings.92 Those most immediately impacted by the sweeping stan-
dards are individuals entrusted to keep the public informed—journalists. 
C. Media Access and the ECCC’s Use of Sanctions 
1. Freedom of Expression in Cambodia 
Media access at the ECCC cannot be fully understood outside the 
context of Cambodia’s treatment of the press and its obligations under 
both domestic and international law to respect freedom of expression. 
                                                     
 88. ECCC Practice Direction, supra note 63, art. 8.1 (emphasis added). 
 89. The Practice Direction defines “[a]uthorised court staff” as “staff approved by the Co-
Investigating Judges or a Chamber, as appropriate, for the purposes of this Practice Direction.” Id. 
art. 2(a). 
 90. The Practice Direction defines “court” as “the Co-Investigating Judges or a Chamber, as 
appropriate.” Id. art. 2(b). 
 91. See id. art. 2. 
 92. See, e.g., Erika Kinetz, Tensions Mount Between ECCC Officials, Media, CAMBODIA 
DAILY, Mar. 3, 2008, at 1–2. 
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Article 41 of the Cambodian Constitution affirms that freedom of expres-
sion, press, publication, and assembly are guaranteed to Khmer citizens 
pursuant to domestic law.93 Moreover, Article 31 of the Cambodian Con-
stitution mandates that Cambodia “recognize and respect human rights as 
stipulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNDR) and 
other covenants and conventions related to human rights.”94 Both the 
UNDR95 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR),96 a widely recognized covenant on human rights, expressly 
protect freedom of expression. Yet, despite Cambodia’s mandate to re-
spect freedom of expression under both domestic and international law, 
restrictions on the media continue to be a problem. 
The ECCC was established to serve as a model for the domestic 
Cambodian legal system for good reason: freedom of expression is a 
longstanding problem in Cambodia.97 A 2010 U.N. Human Rights Coun-
cil report highlighted freedom of expression as one of the major areas of 
concern in Cambodia,98 and it noted that “the courts do not seem to in-
terpret the law and restrictions on freedom of expression according to 
domestic laws, much less international standards binding Cambodia.”99 
Restrictions on freedom of expression appear to be increasing.100 Of 
particular concern is Cambodia’s promulgation of defamation and disin-
formation laws in 2009, the implementation of which, according to the 
U.N., has failed to strike a proper balance between safeguarding private 
reputations and publicizing information concerning matters of public 
interest.101 Similarly, Human Rights Watch recently highlighted as par-
ticularly problematic the Cambodian government’s threats of arrest and 
legal action against journalists, and it suggested that such measures are 
                                                     
 93. CONSTITUTION OF CAMBODIA, Sept. 21, 1993, art. 41. 
 94. Id. art. 31. 
 95. Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states, “Everyone has the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference 
and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of fron-
tiers.” Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) 
(Dec. 10, 1948). 
 96. Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides, “Everyone 
shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and 
impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, 
in the form of art, or through any media of his choice.” International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. RES/2200A(XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966). 
 97. Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Cambodia, supra note 23, ¶ 33. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT: EVENTS OF 2010 295 (2011), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2011/01/24/world-report-2011. 
 101. Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Cambodia, supra note 23, ¶ 33. 
For a recent summary of domestic prosecutions of journalists in Cambodia, see id. ¶ 33–39. 
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often used as a means to restrict free speech.102 Notably, Human Rights 
Watch also reported that ten journalists were killed in Cambodia during 
the past fifteen years.103 
In serving as a model for the Cambodian judiciary, the ECCC thus 
has the potential to either help alleviate the troubling domestic judicial 
practices or to further contribute to deterioration of freedom of expres-
sion in Cambodia. 
2. Media Access During Judicial Investigations at the ECCC 
The Co-Investigating Judges and Pre-Trial Chamber have made few 
exceptions to the presumption of confidentiality during the pretrial inves-
tigation. On several occasions, the court has warned journalists of possi-
ble sanctions for reporting stories related to confidential court proceed-
ings. 
During the investigation in Case 001 against Duch in 2008, Tracey 
Shelton, a reporter for the Phnom Penh Post, was questioned for several 
hours by local police outside Tuol Sleng on the day of Duch’s return, and 
her digital photographs were later erased.104 The Cambodia Daily re-
ported that same day that John Vink, a Magnum photographer, “was 
warned by a tribunal official that if he published a photograph of Duch 
he would be blacklisted from the court.”105 General Manager of the 
Cambodian Television Network (CTV), Glen Felgate, also reported that 
he was told by the former U.N. public affairs officer, Peter Foster, not to 
air CTV footage collected that day.106 
During Duch’s return to Tuol Sleng, ECCC staff issued clear warn-
ings that journalists could be sanctioned for documenting the confidential 
event. As reported by the Cambodia Daily, ECCC Public Affairs Chief 
Helen Jarvis warned that “under the tribunal’s internal rules any person, 
whether an employee of the court or not, who knowingly discloses confi-
dential information in violation of a judicial order is subject to sanction 
by the tribunal, Cambodian authorities, or the United Nations.”107 The 
Cambodia Daily also reported that an ECCC official expressly warned 
journalists that they could be prosecuted for violating the tribunal’s con-
fidentiality.108 
                                                     
 102. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 100, at 295. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Erika Kinetz & Prak Chan Thul, ECCC, Journalists Clash Over Tribunal Access, 
CAMBODIA DAILY, Feb. 28, 2008, at 26. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
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The experience of journalists during the investigation of Case 001 
has led many to think twice before reporting on controversial subjects. 
The head of the Asia-Pacific desk of Reporters Without Borders, Vincent 
Brossel, expressed his concern at what he called a “growing tension be-
tween the press and the tribunal officials.”109 Another local reporter, Ek 
Madra, who was told to leave the area when Duch visited the infamous 
Choeung Ek Killing Fields, expressed his frustration at having to rely on 
“second source[s]” of information.110 
During the investigation for Case 002, in which four senior mem-
bers of the Khmer Rouge are being tried,111 the Pre-Trial Chamber issued 
a series of warnings that confidential information from Pre-Trial Cham-
ber documents had been published by the media. In July 2010, the Pre-
Trial Chamber warned that two Cambodia Daily newspaper articles ad-
dressing the public’s growing concerns of political bias at the court 
breached the confidential judicial investigation because the Pre-Trial 
Chamber did not expressly give the author access to the information.112 
The Pre-Trial Chamber did not elaborate on why a breach of confiden-
tiality occurred, and it only referred to the protected material generally—
as “the matters.”113 
In September 2010, the Pre-Trial Chamber again warned parties of 
the consequences of leaking confidential information, yet failed to ex-
plain why such articles breached confidentiality measures or what infor-
mation was protected.114 Like the July 2010 warning, the articles related 
to charges of political interference, a topic that is the subject of much 
controversy at the ECCC.115 At least one of the articles referenced a de-
                                                     
 109. Id. 
 110. Kinetz, supra note 92, at 1–2. 
 111. The Closing Order for Case 002 against Ieng Sary, Nuon Chea, Ieng Thirith, and Khieu 
Samphan, was filed on September 15, 2010. Ieng Sary, former Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign 
Affairs; Nuon Chea, former Chair of the People’s Representative Assembly; Khieu Samphan, former 
Chair of the State Presidium; and Ieng Thirith, former Minister of Social Affairs are being tried in 
proceedings that began in 2011. Closing Order, Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC-OCIJ (Office of 
the Co-Investigating Judges Sept. 15, 2010). 
 112. Warning for Unauthorized Disclosure of Confidential Information, Case No. 002/19-09-
2007-ECCC/OCIJ, ¶ 1 (Pre-Trial Chamber July 9, 2010). The warning referenced the following 
articles as breaching the confidentiality of judicial investigations: Douglas Gillison, Nuon Chea 
Team Accuses You Bunleng of Political Bias, CAMBODIA DAILY, June 28, 2010, at 30; Douglas 
Gillison, Ieng Sary Lawyers Push for Tribunal Inquest on Government, CAMBODIA DAILY, June 23, 
2010, at 20. 
 113. Warning for Unauthorized Disclosure of Confidential Information, Case No. 002/19-09-
2007-ECCC/OCIJ, ¶ 1. 
 114. Directive on Classification of Pre-Trial Chamber Documents, Case No. 002/07-07-2010-
ECCC/PTC10, ¶ 5 (Pre-Trial Chamber Sept. 9, 2010). 
 115. Id. Articles cited include Douglas Gillison, All Final Pretrial Appeals in Case 002 De-
cided at Tribunal, CAMBODIA DAILY, July 16, 2010, at 26; Douglas Gillison, Nuon Chea Lawyers 
Renew Call for Political Inquiry, CAMBODIA DAILY, July 9, 2010, at 24; Douglas Gillison, KRT 
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fense team filing not yet present on the ECCC website that “accused the 
government of pursuing a ‘concerted policy’ to prevent the questioning 
of government officials and derail investigations into additional regime 
figures.”116 
The lack of media access is perhaps most troubling with respect to 
the Case 003 investigation, during which the Co-Investigating Judges 
failed to release any information before announcing the end of investiga-
tions in April 2011 thus preventing victims from applying as civil par-
ties.117 In response, International Co-Prosecutor Andrew Cayley issued a 
public statement, the purpose of which was “to ensure that the public is 
duly informed about ongoing ECCC proceedings.”118 Cayley discussed 
specifics of Case 003 and stated his belief that “the crimes alleged in the 
Introductory Submission have not been fully investigated.”119 The Co-
Investigating Judges found that Cayley breached the duty of confidential-
ity by disclosing details of Case 003 and thus ordered that he retract the 
information.120 
Several days later, the press was again the target of ECCC warnings 
when a June 2011 article, “Leaked Document Casts Doubt on Impartiali-
ty of Khmer Rouge Judges” appeared in the Christian Science Moni-
tor.121 Referencing a 2008 confidential court document that “raises ques-
tions about the UN-backed court’s ability to independently prosecute 
members of the brutal regime,” the article was critical of the Co-
Investigating Judges’ ability to conduct impartial investigations.122 The 
following day, the Judges issued another press release addressing the 
                                                                                                                       
Prosecutor Says Journalists Face Prosecution, CAMBODIA DAILY, June 10, 2010; Adrien Le Gal, Le 
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(Co-Investigating Judges Apr. 29, 2011). 
 118. Press release, Statement by the International Co-Prosecutor Regarding Case File 003 
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 122. Ferrie, supra note 121. 
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“disloyal staff member of the ECCC” who disclosed the information.123 
The press release was targeted to journalists and warned that “anyone 
publishing information from [the] confidential document is liable to be 
subjected to proceedings for Interference with the Administration of Jus-
tice pursuant to Internal Rule 35.”124 
By apparently operating without clear standards and by failing to 
provide reasons why certain documents breached confidential investiga-
tions, the ECCC is sacrificing public access for what appear to be base-
less confidentiality needs. While allegations of political interference call 
into question the integrity of the judicial investigation and ECCC staff, 
generalized information regarding the call for a corruption probe has 
seemingly little impact on the quality of the investigations themselves. 
Moreover, the journalists who published confidential information 
had no way of knowing that their sources provided information that may 
breach the confidentiality of the investigation, for the journalists them-
selves were not bound by an express protective order. Members of the 
media have already expressed the frustration of having to rely on sec-
ondary sources of information,125 and, given the widespread corruption 
of the judiciary in Cambodia,126 relying on government officials as the 
only source of information undermines the media’s role as a watchdog. 
Thus, the alternative implicitly suggested by the ECCC—requiring 
members of the media to first check with the tribunal to ensure that in-
formation is not confidential—is not only impractical but would also be a 
serious restraint on freedom of the press in Cambodia. 
Despite its mandate to serve as a model for domestic courts and at-
tempt to correct the culture of corruption in Cambodia, the ECCC con-
tinues to maintain a strict presumption of confidentiality during judicial 
investigations. Increased warnings to the press create a disincentive to 
report to the public,127 which ultimately hurts the Cambodian people by 
undermining their access to justice and reconciliation. The disincentive 
to report sensitive information, like allegations of political bias, is only 
exacerbated by the threat to sanction journalists pursuant to ECCC Inter-
nal Rules. 
                                                     
 123. Press Release, ECCC Co-Investigating Judges, Public Statement by the Co-Investigating 
Judges (June 9, 2011) available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/articles/public-statement-co-inves 
tigating-judges. 
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 125. Kinetz, supra note 92, at 1–2. 
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3. Sanctioning Lawyers at the ECCC: Rule 38 
While the Co-Prosecutors, Office of Co-Investigating Judges, and 
Pre-Trial Chamber have threatened to use sanctions on numerous occa-
sions, sanctions have been applied at the ECCC only once.128 In March 
2009, the Co-Investigating Judges sanctioned Ieng Sary’s international 
defense lawyer, Michael Karnavas, pursuant to ECCC Internal Rule 38 
for revealing confidential information on his website.129 The judges or-
dered the defense team to remove the offending content and cease post-
ing information or documents related to the judicial investigations other 
than those posted on the ECCC website.130 
The sanctioning of the Ieng Sary defense team sparked widespread 
criticism of the ECCC because the information posted mostly related to 
Ieng Sary himself and his deteriorating medical condition.131 Many 
members of the public were concerned that the true reason for the sanc-
tions was not to protect the confidential judicial investigations but rather 
to hide the ECCC’s own shortcomings.132 A letter written by the Ieng 
Sary defense team in response to the sanctions stated in part that 
[t]he current practice by the Judicial Chambers and the Co-
Investigating Judges at the ECCC, of suppressing Defence filings 
which may be embarrassing or which call into question the legiti-
macy and judiciousness of acts and decisions of the judges, all un-
der the fig leaf that these are necessary measures to protect the sup-
posed confidentiality and integrity of the investigations or judicial 
                                                     
 128. At the time of this Comment’s publication, Michael Karnavas is the only individual to 
have been sanctioned by the ECCC. See Kinetz, supra note 92, at 1–2. 
 129. Order on the Breach of Confidentiality of the Judicial Investigation, Case No. 002/14-08-
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use of sanctions for breaches of confidentiality, e.g., RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AT THE 
EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA: MAY 2008 UPDATE, supra note 21. 
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decision-making process, must be discontinued without excep-
tion . . . . To allow non-confidential issues to be debated behind 
closed doors not only deprives Mr. I[eng] Sary of a fair and public 
trial but also deprives Cambodia of a demonstration of how com-
plex trials for the most serious crimes can be conducted openly and 
transparently.133 
While the Ieng Sary defense team letter raises concerns over defen-
dants’ rights to a fair trial, it also touches upon a very real concern that 
confidentiality measures are not being used to protect sensitive investiga-
tions but rather to shield the Co-Investigating Judges and ECCC officials 
from public scrutiny. The measures are problematic, for absent compel-
ling reasons to maintain a strict presumption of confidentiality, in order 
to fulfill its mandate to serve as a means of national reconciliation and as 
a model for the Cambodian legal system, the ECCC should provide open 
access to court proceedings. If the defense team chose to publicize in-
formation about Ieng Sary, there seems to be no compelling reason why 
such a practice should be forbidden. And any reasons of the Co-
Investigating Judges are unknown, for the order lacked clear reason-
ing.134 
4. Sanctioning Any Person Who Interferes with the Administration 
of Justice: Rule 35 
A separate, broader-reaching ECCC Internal Rule governs interfe-
rence with the administration of justice as it expressly applies to any per-
son. Rule 35 states in part that 
1. The ECCC may sanction or refer to the appropriate authorities, 
any person who knowingly and wilfully interferes with the adminis-
tration of justice, including any person who 
a) discloses confidential information in violation of an order of the 
Co-Investigating Judges or the Chambers; 
. . . . 
d) threatens, intimidates, causes any injury or offers a bribe to, or 
otherwise interferes with a witness, or potential witness, who is giv-
ing, has given, or may give evidence in proceedings before the Co-
Investigating Judges or a Chamber; 
                                                     
 133. Letter from Ang Udom & Michael G. Karnava, Co-Lawyers for Ieng Sary, to Sean Vi-
soth, Kranh Tony, & Knut Rosanhaug (Dec. 18, 2008), available at http://sites.google.com/site/ 
iengsarydefence/letters-1. See also Order on the Breach of Confidentiality of the Judicial Investiga-
tion, Case No. 002/14-08-2006, ¶ 2 (emphasis added). 
 134. See Order on the Breach of Confidentiality of the Judicial Investigation, Case No. 002/14-
08-2006. 
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. . . .135 
No journalists have been sanctioned by the ECCC, but should the 
threats become a reality, members of the media will be sanctioned pur-
suant to Rule 35(1)(a).136 
While no Rule 35 sanctions have been applied by the ECCC, the 
contours of Rule 35 were addressed in a series of recent decisions regard-
ing the refusal of six witnesses—all former officials of Democratic 
Kampuchea and current government officials—to comply with court 
summons.137 While the decisions relate to Rule 35(1)(d) sanctions for 
intimidating witnesses, they provide valuable guidance regarding the 
standards of proof for initiating investigations of alleged interference 
with the administration of justice. In its decision, the Pre-Trial Chamber 
relied heavily on jurisprudence from the ICTY, suggesting that if the 
ECCC does sanction journalists pursuant to Rule 35, it will likely place 
great weight on the ICTY’s most recent contempt decisions. 
In September 2010, the Pre-Trial Chamber adopted the ICTY’s 
three standards of proof relevant to Rule 35 that were first articulated in a 
series of contempt proceedings against journalists covering the ICTY.138 
First, to initiate investigations pursuant to Rule 35, there need only be 
reason to believe an individual interfered with the administration of jus-
tice, identified by the Pre-Trial Chamber as an “extremely low thre-
shold”139 that does not require an inquiry into the merits but simply a ma-
terial basis for initiating investigations.140 Second, to instigate proceed-
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Investigating Judges to Witness Ouk Bunchhoeun (Sept. 25, 2009) (requesting appearance as witness 
due to past statements). The identity of the sixth witness is unknown. 
 138. Second Decision on Nuon Chea’s and Ieng Sary’s Appeal Against OCIJ Order on Re-
quests to Summon Witnesses (Public Redacted), Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ, ¶ 32–39 
(Pre-Trial Chamber Sept. 9, 2010). The Pre-Trial Chamber relied on Prosecutor v. Haraqija and 
Morina, Case No. IT-04-84-R77.4, Judgment on Allegations of Contempt (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2008); Prosecutor v. Beqaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T-R77, Judgment on 
Contempt Allegations (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 23, 2005); and Prosecutor 
v. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-AR77/2, Decision on the Prosecution’s Appeal Against the Trial 
Chamber’s Decision of 10 June 2008 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 25, 2008). 
 139. Second Decision on Nuon Chea’s and Ieng Sary’s Appeal Against OCIJ Order on Re-
quests to Summon Witnesses, Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ, ¶ 36–37. 
 140. Id. ¶ 37. 
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ings related to Rule 35, there must be sufficient grounds showing interfe-
rence with the administration of justice.141 Finally, before sanctions can 
be imposed on an individual for a violation of Rule 35, the burden of 
proof must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt.142 
The Pre-Trial Chamber decision not only illustrates the contours of 
Rule 35 but also highlights the need for a free press to cover ECCC de-
velopments. At issue in the proceeding that produced the September 
2010 decision was an allegation of political interference on behalf of a 
current government official who reportedly urged summoned witnesses 
not to testify before the tribunal.143 Despite government spokesman 
Khieu Kanharith’s statement that while the six summoned witnesses 
“could appear in court voluntarily, the government’s position was that 
they should not give testimony,”144 the Co-Investigating Judges dis-
missed several requests for investigative action and Rule 35 investiga-
tions filed by defense teams.145 
On appeal, the Pre-Trial Chamber failed to reach a majority deci-
sion on whether the statement of Khieu Kanharith constituted a “reason 
to believe” that there was an interference with the administration of jus-
tice under Rule 35.146 The Pre-Trial Chamber was sharply divided. The 
two international judges stated “no reasonable trier of fact could have 
failed to consider” that there was a reason to believe an interference with 
the administration of justice pursuant to Rule 35(1)(d) had occurred.147 
In contrast, the Cambodian judges distinguished Khieu Kanharith’s 
use of the term “should not” from use of the term “shall” and concluded 
that there was no absolute order that the individuals should not testify.148 
The Cambodian judges also reasoned that because the statement was re-
ported by the Phnom Penh Post, it was an inadequate and unreliable 
source of information.149 In addition, the Cambodian judges considered 
that because Khieu Kanharith was of a lower status, rank, and title than 
                                                     
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. ¶ 39. 
 143. Sebastian Strangio & Cheang Sokha, Government Testimony Could Bias KRT: PM, 
PHNOM PENH POST, Oct. 9, 2009. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Second Decision on Nuon Chea’s and Ieng Sary’s Appeal Against OCIJ Order on Re-
quests to Summon Witnesses, Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ, ¶ 4–5. 
 146. Id. ¶ 41. 
 147. Id. ¶ 6 (opinion of Judges Catherine Marchi-Uhel and Rowan Downing) (noting that the 
Pre-Trial Chamber should investigate the matter because the Co-Investigating Judges have “repeat-
edly refused to investigate this matter and may not, in these circumstances be the body most suitable 
to conduct an investigation into these allegations of interference”). 
 148. Id. ¶ 7 (opinion of Judges Prak Kimsah, Ney Thol, and Huot Vuthy). 
 149. Id. ¶ 8. 
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the six dignitaries summoned, he was “in principle not entitled to order 
or coerce those of higher status to follow . . . orders.”150 
The division among the Pre-Trial Chamber raises great concern re-
garding the potential for political interference at the ECCC, especially 
considering Cambodia’s domestic culture of corruption in the judi-
ciary.151 The division among international and domestic judges, a com-
mon occurrence at the ECCC, raises red flags and highlights the impor-
tance of a free press to cover ECCC proceedings not only to fulfill the 
tribunal’s objective to serve as a model for domestic Cambodian courts 
but also to ensure that ECCC proceedings themselves are fair and 
grounded in the law. Without public scrutiny, the ECCC has little ac-
countability during the pretrial period, and the Cambodian people are 
deprived of vital information during confidential investigations that span 
the course of several months.152 
While the Pre-Trial Chamber has established some of the procedur-
al requirements regarding Rule 35, it has not yet applied those standards 
to allegations of media interference with the administration of justice. In 
potential sanctions against journalists, the Co-Investigating Judges and 
Pre-Trial Chamber are likely to rely on recent contempt jurisprudence at 
the ICTY since Cambodian domestic law has no similar provision for 
sanctioning the press.153 The most recent case, Prosecutor v. Hart-
mann,154 will likely prove very influential and is the first ICTY contempt 
case to balance confidentiality orders with freedom of expression. 
III. CONTEMPT AT THE ICTY: DELIBERATE VIOLATION OF A 
PROTECTIVE ORDER 
Unlike the ECCC, the ICTY, like most other international tribunals, 
operates under adversarial procedural rules, and its contempt jurispru-
dence is based on breaches of protective orders that occurred during trial 
                                                     
 150. Id. ¶ 9. 
 151. Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Cambodia, supra note 23, ¶ 52. 
 152. In Case 001 against Duch, prosecutors filed their introductory submission on July 18, 
2007 thus beginning the judicial investigation. Closing Order indicting Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch 
(Public Redacted), Case No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC-OCIJ, ¶ 4 (Office of the Co-Investigating 
Judges Aug. 8, 2008). The investigation ended nearly a year later on May 15, 2008, id. ¶ 7, and the 
closing order was issued on August 8, 2008. In Case 002, the prosecutors filed their introductory 
submission on July 18, 2007, and the closing order was not filed until September 15, 2010. Closing 
Order, Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC-OCIJ, ¶ 3–14 (Office of the Co-Investigating Judges, Sept. 
15, 2010). 
 153. See CAMBODIAN CODE OF CRIM. P. 
 154. Prosecutor v. Hartmann, Case No. IT-02-54-R77.5, Judgment on Allegations of Contempt 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 14, 2009). 
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proceedings otherwise presumed public.155 Nonetheless, the ECCC relies 
heavily on ICTY jurisprudence, and recent contempt proceedings of the 
ICTY are likely to prove highly influential should the tribunal sanction 
pursuant to Rule 35. 
Section A explains the contours of protected information at the 
ICTY, while section B summarizes the current state of the law. Section C 
analyzes the most recent ICTY contempt case, Prosecutor v. Hartmann, 
and concludes by suggesting that Hartmann should hold little persuasive 
value at the ECCC. 
A. The Contours of Protected Information at the ICTY 
The ICTY operates under an adversarial system in which trial pro-
ceedings are open to the public.156 During the trial period, protective or-
ders may be granted at the request of parties pursuant to ICTY Procedur-
al Rule 69, which ensures the protection of victims and witnesses. In ad-
dition, a judge or trial chamber may order the nondisclosure of docu-
ments or information in exceptional circumstances, pursuant to ICTY 
Rule 53.157 
Historically, individuals who were granted access to confidential 
information by the tribunal were put on clear notice. For example, in a 
2003 decision on a motion for nondisclosure, the ICTY trial chamber 
permitted defendant Vojislav Seselj access to the identity of witnesses 
protected pursuant to Rule 69.158 The order provided clear instructions 
that detailed what information was protected.159 The trial chamber also 
made clear that if Seselj found it necessary to disclose information to 
others in building his case, he was obligated to instruct the other individ-
uals that the material was not to be copied, reproduced, publicized, or 
disclosed in any manner.160 The protective order ended with a clear direc-
tion that any breach would result in contempt proceedings in accordance 
                                                     
 155. See, e.g., ICTY R. P. & EVID., Rev. 45, 8 Dec. 2010, r. 69; r. 53 (requiring affirmative 
steps to protect victims, witnesses, and information). 
 156. See id. r. 69 (allowing for protection of victims and witnesses); r. 53 (allowing for non-
disclosure of information); r. 75 (allowing for in camera hearings to protect victims and witnesses). 
 157. Id. r. 53(a). 
 158. Vojislav Seselj, Assistant Professor of political science at the University of Sarajevo, was 
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war. In 2009, Seselj was found to have knowingly and willfully interfered with the administration of 
justice by disclosing confidential information contained in orders granting protective measures to 
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thored. Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-R77.2, Decision on Allegations of Contempt (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 21, 2009). 
 159. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion 
for Order of Non-Disclosure, ¶ 3 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 13, 2003). 
 160. See, e.g., id. ¶ 4. 
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with ICTY Rule 77.161 Thus, recipients of confidential information at the 
ICTY, like Seselj, were informed not only of the contours of the pro-
tected information but were also given notice regarding their obligations 
to keep that information private, and were warned of the potential use of 
sanctions should protected information be disclosed. 
B. Contempt at the ICTY: Current State of the Law 
ICTY Procedural Rule 77 governs contempt of the tribunal. The 
language of ICTY Rule 77 is nearly identical to that of ECCC Internal 
Rule 35,162 and relevant portions state that 
(A) The Tribunal in the exercise of its inherent power may hold in 
contempt those who knowingly and wilfully interfere with its ad-
ministration of justice, including any person who . . . 
(ii) discloses information relating to those proceedings in knowing 
violation of an order of a Chamber . . . .163 
The ICTY has prosecuted several reporters pursuant to Rule 77(ii), and 
until Hartmann, divulging the identity of a protected witness was a subs-
tantive interference with the administration of justice that resulted in the 
convictions.164 
                                                     
 161. See, e.g., id. ¶ 7. 
 162. In addition, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Rules of Procedure and Evi-
dence Rule 77 and the Special Court for Sierra Leone Rules of Evidence and Procedure Rule 77 are 
identical to ICTY Rule 77. 
 163. It is important to note that the ICTY is modeled after a common law system in which 
there is no express presumption of confidentiality, and investigations are conducted by prosecutors 
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EVID., Rev. 12, 10 July 1999; ICTY R. P. & EVID., Rev. 14, 4 Dec. 1998. 
 164. In March 2006, Editor in Chief of Hrvatski List, Ivica Marijacic, was convicted and sen-
tenced to pay a fine of 15,000 Euros after he published an article in which the identity of a protected 
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ings before the tribunal were made public. Prosecutor v. Ivica Marijacic & Markica Rebic, Case No. 
IT-95-14-R77.2, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 10, 2006). In February 
2007, freelance journalist Domagoj Margetic was sentenced to three months imprisonment and a fine 
of 10,000 Euros when he published a complete confidential witness list from the case Prosecutor v. 
Tihomir Blaskic on his website. Prosecutor v. Domagoj Margetic, Case No. IT-95-14-R77.6, Judg-
ment on Allegations of Contempt (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 7, 2007). In 
March 2007, Editor in Chief of the Slobadna Dalmacija, Josip Jovic, was sentenced to pay a fine of 
20,000 Euros for disclosing the identity and testimony of a protected witness. Prosecutor v. Jovic, 
Case No. IT-95-14 & 14/2-R77-A, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 15, 
2007). In July 2008, Baton Haxhiu, former editor of a Kosovo newspaper, was sentenced to pay a 
fine of 7,000 Euros after he revealed the identity of a protected witness in an article he wrote and 
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A violation of ICTY Rule 77 requires that an individual knowingly 
and willfully interfere with the administration of justice. The requisite 
mens rea for a violation of Rule 77(ii) is knowledge that the disclosure in 
question violates an order of a chamber.165 The disclosure must be deli-
berate and may be inferred from circumstantial evidence. While willful 
blindness and reckless indifference can establish intent, mere negligence 
is insufficient.166 Specific intent to interfere with the administration of 
justice is not required.167 
The requisite actus reus under Rule 77(A)(ii) “is the physical act of 
disclosure of information relating to proceedings before the [t]ribunal, 
where such disclosure [objectively] breaches” either a written or oral 
order of a chamber.168 The ICTY requires no materiality of harm, nor 
does it make an exception for information that is already in the public 
domain—once a knowing violation of a chamber’s order is proved, no 
additional proof of harm to the tribunal’s administration of justice is re-
quired in order to sustain a conviction of contempt.169 Thus, a violation 
of a court order “as such” constitutes an interference with the tribunal’s 
administration of justice.170 
C. Contempt at the ICTY: The Case Against Florence Hartmann 
Prosecutor v. Hartmann is not only the most recent ICTY contempt 
case but it is also the first case to find a journalist guilty of contempt for 
discussing the existence of a confidential appellate chamber document 
that she herself had not seen. Hartmann’s offense is thus very similar to 
breaches of confidentiality at the ECCC, in which reporters were warned 
for referencing confidential documents to which they had no access.171 
While there are striking similarities between Hartmann and the sort of 
case likely to come before the ECCC, there are also very important pro-
                                                                                                                       
published. Prosecutor v. Haxhiu, Case No. IT-04-84-R77.5, Judgment on Allegations of Contempt 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 24, 2008). 
 165. Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-R77.2-A, Judgment, ¶ 26 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia May 19, 2010) (citing Prosecutor v. Jovic, Case No. IT-95-14 & 14/2-R77-
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 166. Prosecutor v. Hartmann, Case No. IT-02-54-R77.5, Judgment on Allegations of Con-
tempt, ¶ 22 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 14, 2009). 
 167. Id. ¶ 53. 
 168. Id. ¶ 20–21. 
 169. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-R77.2-A, ¶ 29 (citing Jovic, Case No. IT-95-14 & 14/2-R77-A, 
¶ 20). 
 170. Id. ¶ 20. 
 171. See Warning for Unauthorized Disclosure of Confidential Information, Case No. 002/19-
09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ, ¶ 1 (Pre-Trial Chamber July 9, 2010); Directive on Classification of Pre-Trial 
Chamber Documents, Case No. 002/07-07-2010-ECCC/PTC10, ¶ 5 (Pre-Trial Chamber Sept. 9, 
2010). 
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cedural differences governing the ICTY and the ECCC—differences that 
warrant departure from Hartmann’s precedent. 
1. The Protection of Legal Reasoning and Extraneous Information 
Hartmann was convicted for releasing politically sensitive informa-
tion regarding the role of Serbia in the massacre of Bosnian Muslims—
information the tribunal likely worried could impact peace in the region 
and spark political unrest. In 2007, Hartmann, a former spokesperson for 
ICTY Prosecutor Carla del Ponte,172 published a book, Peace and Pu-
nishment: The Secret War between Politics and International Justice, 
and a 2008 article entitled Vital Genocide Documents Concealed.173 In 
her publications, Hartmann wrote that in the case against Slobodan Milo-
sevic, the appeals chamber failed to release certain transcripts that evi-
denced the involvement of Serbia in the massacre of Bosnian Muslims. 
Hartmann stated that “ICTY judges kept key material from the public for 
the sole purpose of shielding Serbia from responsibility before another 
UN court.”174 In her discussion, Hartmann referenced two confidential 
appeals chamber decisions, and according to the ICTY specially ap-
pointed chamber, Hartmann addressed their contents and purported ef-
fect.175 
The specially appointed chamber ruled that Hartmann interfered 
with the administration of justice by knowingly disclosing information 
contained in confidential decisions in the case of Prosecutor v. Slobodan 
Milosevic.176 Hartmann disclosed the date of the decisions, their confi-
dential character, the identity of Serbia as an applicant for protective 
measures, and the existence of underlying documents, but the special 
chamber also ruled that the legal reasoning contained in the decisions 
was itself protected by the order: 
[L]egal reasoning by its very nature requires the application of the 
law to the facts, and therefore requires the whole reasoning to be 
protected. The law is public while the facts often are not. The appli-
cation of the law to the facts is confidential by virtue of the mix of 
the two.177 
                                                     
 172. Carla del Ponte was also restricted from discussing controversies regarding the ICTY’s 
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In so holding, the specially appointed chamber greatly expanded the 
scope of protective measures at the ICTY. 
2. No Requirement of Specific Intent 
Despite Hartmann’s defense that she did not intend to breach an or-
der of the tribunal, the specially appointed chamber found that Hartmann 
possessed the requisite intent and failed to require specific intent to 
breach a protective order under Rule 77.178 Unlike in previous cases of 
contempt at the ICTY, such as Seselj,179 Hartmann never saw the appeals 
chamber decisions herself, nor did she sign a receipt for a protective or-
der; rather, Hartmann relied on an informational interview of another 
individual.180 Yet, the chamber refused to consider that Hartmann’s in-
tent had been undermined.181 What did matter, the chamber reasoned, 
was that Hartmann became aware of the confidential information and the 
fact of its confidential status but chose to disclose the information none-
theless.182 The chamber placed great weight on Hartmann’s knowledge of 
the confidential status, apparent from her articles’ explicit reference to 
the documents’ “confidential” nature, as well as a warning from the 
ICTY registrar sent to Hartmann before publication.183 Despite the fact 
that Hartmann never read the confidential decisions or signed a receipt 
for a protective order, she was found to possess the necessary mens rea 
under Rule 77. 
3. No Mistake-of-Fact Defense 
In its decision, the chamber suggested that Hartmann should have 
first checked with the tribunal to ensure that her publications were in 
compliance with the law, and that her failure to do so precluded her from 
using a mistake-of-fact defense.184 Although the information Hartmann 
disclosed was generally known to the public and was the subject of me-
dia discussion prior to her publications, the chamber failed to consider 
that Hartmann could have reasonably believed the information was no 
longer confidential.185 Instead, the chamber reasoned, Hartmann should 
have checked with the United Nations or the tribunal prior to publica-
tion.186 
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4. Freedom of Expression 
Prosecutor v. Hartmann is the first ICTY contempt case to specifi-
cally balance the need for confidentiality with the protection of freedom 
of expression. In a brief discussion, the chamber noted jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which requires that an 
interference with freedom of expression be legitimate, necessary, and 
proportionate in order to be permissible.187 Yet, the chamber failed to 
conduct an adequate balancing test under the ECHR framework and ul-
timately concluded that the use of sanctions was not an infringement on 
Hartmann’s freedom of expression. 
First, the chamber considered the protective order that shielded the 
appellate court opinions and its purpose. According to the chamber, the 
purpose of the provision was to secure the cooperation of a foreign state, 
Serbia, as well as the public interest in receiving information.188 The con-
tours of the protected information were made clear through an express 
order.189 Therefore, whether the public was entitled to the information 
was to be determined by the tribunal, not reporters. The tribunal sharply 
criticized Hartmann and stated that “[i]ndividuals, including journalists, 
may not—with impunity—publish information in defiance of such orders 
on the basis of their own assessment of the public interest in accessing 
that information.”190 Because Hartmann published her work in violation 
of a legitimate express order, the chamber concluded that Hartmann un-
dermined the confidence of the tribunal and potentially undermined “the 
level of cooperation that is vital to the administration of international 
justice.”191 
While the chamber acknowledged the ECHR test, it was inade-
quately applied when the chamber determined that there was no interfe-
rence with Hartmann’s freedom of expression. The chamber conducted 
an incomplete analysis of the public’s interest in receiving the informa-
tion and held that the contempt proceedings were proportionate absent 
substantial reasoning.192 In holding that there was no interference with 
Hartmann’s freedom of expression, the chamber deviated from well-
established precedent, the implications of which could be far-reaching. 
The chamber’s decision only briefly addressed what constitutes a 
wealth of jurisprudence at the ECHR—jurisprudence that specifically 
addresses the role of the press in confidential judicial investigations in 
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civil law courts.193 Due to its specific application in civil law systems and 
the wealth of case law available, the ECHR jurisprudence regarding in-
fringement on freedom of expression serves as a better basis upon which 
the ECCC should develop its case law. 
IV. SANCTIONS AT THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A 
NECESSARY AND PROPORTIONATE INFRINGEMENT ON 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
ICTY Rule 77 is nearly identical to ECCC Internal Rule 35; how-
ever, Rule 77 applies at ICTY trial proceedings, which are presumed to 
be public at both the ECCC and ICTY, and are protected only after the 
court issues an affirmative protective order.194 The ECHR has expressly 
ruled on media access and breaches of confidentiality during confidential 
judicial investigations in countries that use civil law systems and thus 
establishes more appropriate jurisprudence for use at the ECCC. 
Unlike the ICTY, violations of protective orders or breaches of con-
fidential judicial investigations are not “as such” considered to be interfe-
rences; the ECHR applies a case-by-case balancing test to determine 
whether an infringement on freedom of expression is permissible. First, 
there must be a legitimate aim for establishing a confidentiality order;195 
second, the legitimate aim must be a necessary infringement in a demo-
cratic society, demonstrable by a pressing social need;196 and finally, the 
interference must be proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued, and 
the reasons justifying the interference must be relevant and sufficient.197 
In evaluating international standards regarding sanctions under In-
ternal Rule 35, the ECCC may seek guidance in procedural rules estab-
lished at the international level, and there is no mandate that any one 
source should be given greater deference in such inquires.198 Thus, there 
is no compelling reason why the ECCC should provide the ICTY con-
tempt jurisprudence more deference than ECHR jurisprudence. In fact, 
because the ECHR applies in countries that use a civil law system, its 
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case law is more specifically tailored to the unique procedural laws of the 
ECCC. 
A. Watchdogs of Democracy and Privacy Interests of Public Officials 
The ECHR not only recognizes the necessary and proportionate ba-
lancing test during confidential judicial investigations but also the impor-
tance of a free press to facilitate political debate. For instance, in Dupuis 
v. France, two journalists were found guilty of possessing information 
obtained through a breach of confidentiality.199 The offense occurred 
when the journalists published information relating to the judicial inves-
tigation of a telephone-tapping program initiated by the former French 
president.200 On an appeal brought by the convicted French journalists, 
the ECHR affirmed that freedom of expression is an essential foundation 
of democratic society and that the safeguards afforded to the press hold 
special importance.201 The court recognized not only the media’s task of 
imparting such information and ideas but also the public’s right to re-
ceive such information.202 
Dupuis stands for the principle that in cases involving important 
matters of public debate, the ECHR requires a greater showing of neces-
sity to infringe on freedom of expression. The court considered that when 
journalists report information obtained though a breach of a confidential 
investigation, yet contribute to an important public debate, they serve as 
“watchdogs” of democracy and should be afforded greater access to in-
formation.203 Thus, in weighing the legitimate purpose of confidentiality 
and the public’s interest in the information the two journalists divulged, 
the ECHR found that the French court violated the journalists’ freedom 
of expression.204 
Also of importance in Dupuis is the court’s recognition that limits 
of freedom of expression are more difficult to justify when the rights of 
politicians are involved, for such individuals knowingly subject them-
selves to close scrutiny and must therefore display a greater degree of 
tolerance: “The Court attaches the highest importance to freedom of ex-
pression in the context of political debate and considers that very strong 
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reasons are required to justify restrictions on political speech.”205 Be-
cause the French president’s privacy interests were at stake, and because 
his role as president exposed him to greater public scrutiny, the interests 
of the public outweighed the interests of privacy.206 
Similarly, journalists threatened with sanctions at the ECCC are 
those covering important proceedings, including those related to allega-
tions of political bias at the court.207 Like in Dupuis, the journalists are 
serving as watchdogs of democracy by ensuring that the tribunal is ac-
countable to a well-informed public. Moreover, the individuals whose 
privacy interests are at stake are also former public officials. Like the 
French president in Dupuis, the former senior leaders of the Khmer 
Rouge sacrificed their privacy when they assumed leadership positions. 
Therefore, their privacy interests are considerably less than members of 
the general population, and the public interest should prevail. 
B. Materiality is an Important Consideration in Infringements  
on Freedom of Expression 
In weighing the concerns of freedom of expression and confidential 
investigations, the ECHR considers the materiality of the breach and 
whether information was already in the public domain at the time of the 
alleged breach. For instance, in Weber v. Switzerland, the court deter-
mined that information already in the public domain at the time it was 
divulged by a journalist was outside the scope of confidentiality protec-
tions.208 In Weber, a Swiss journalist was charged for breaching the con-
fidentiality of a judicial investigation when he made statements at a press 
conference that revealed the existence of a judicial investigation.209 The 
trial court found it of little importance that the matter discussed was al-
ready known to the public and ruled that the actus reus of the crime was 
met, even if the offense had been committed inadvertently.210 
On appeal, the ECHR considered that the information was already 
in the public domain, and because there was no material breach, the in-
fringement on freedom of expression was improper.211 The court agreed 
that the imposition of a fine for Weber’s alleged breach was an unjusti-
fied interference with his right to freedom of expression.212 While the 
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government’s interest in ensuring proper conduct of the investigation 
was necessary,213 the imposition of a penalty was not, for the interest in 
maintaining the confidentiality no longer existed when Weber disclosed 
information that was already in the public domain.214 Weber thus estab-
lishes an important principle: although protection of confidential investi-
gations may be necessary, when information is already in the public do-
main, disclosure of the existence of confidential judicial investigations, 
or the contents of information that are already known to the public, does 
not itself constitute a violation worthy of court action.215 
The principle articulated in Weber is very important considering 
much of the information contained in confidential judicial investigations 
at the ECCC is already in the public domain. For instance, the identity of 
Duch and his involvement with S-21 is well-known and documented.216 
Moreover, the ECCC only has jurisdiction to prosecute individuals for 
crimes that occurred over thirty years ago.217 Considering the length of 
judicial investigations, which span months,218 unintended breaches of 
confidentiality are often immaterial because there is no considerable im-
pact on the outcome of the investigations if select facts become known to 
the public. Given the public interest in information regarding the ECCC 
and the court’s mandate to keep the public informed, breaches without a 
material impact should not serve as a basis for Rule 35 sanctions. 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE ECCC REGARDING THE USE OF 
SANCTIONS AGAINST JOURNALISTS PURSUANT TO  
INTERNAL RULE 35(1)(A) 
Due to its foundation in principles of civil law, the ECCC is a 
unique international criminal tribunal that operates under procedural 
rules far different from those that govern the ICTY and many other tri-
bunals. Thus, the adoption of a per se rule that any breach of a confiden-
tial judicial investigation operates as a violation of ECCC Internal Rule 
35(1)(a) ignores the unique nature of the court and its obligations to keep 
the public informed at all stages of proceedings. 
Section A briefly suggests that the ECCC establish clear standards 
governing the release of information. Section B suggests that in its warn-
ings to journalists who breached the confidentiality of the investigation, 
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the ECCC should include clear reasoning sufficient to put journalists on 
appropriate notice so as to not create a disincentive to report on sensitive 
matters. Finally, section C recommends a case-by-case approach to eva-
luating the use of sanctions against journalists—one that considers the 
materiality of the interference, the importance of the confidentiality need, 
and the intent of the accused journalist. 
A. The ECCC Should Establish Clear Standards Regarding What 
Information is Protected During Confidential Judicial Investigations 
At the ECCC, there is great uncertainty regarding what information 
is public and what is protected by confidential judicial investigations. In 
a country where a significant percentage of the population identifies as a 
survivor of the Khmer Rouge, it is neither possible to keep information 
secret, nor is it in the country’s best interests to do so.219 Considering that 
crimes for which defendants are being tried happened over thirty years 
ago, a great amount of information is already in the public domain. In 
order to keep the public informed in pursuit of its obligation to serve as a 
means of national reconciliation and as a model for the domestic Cam-
bodian court, the ECCC should operate under clear standards that govern 
the distribution of public information.220 
Absent standards for protected information, the disincentive to re-
port on sensitive matters at the ECCC will continue. The disincentive 
will further undermine the public’s access to knowledge and hinder the 
establishment of a free press. In Hartmann, the ICTY found that Hart-
mann should have verified the information in her book with the court 
before publication,221 but requiring ECCC journalists to verify their in-
formation with the tribunal prior to publication is unrealistic and not in 
the public interest. Such requirements would only increase the public’s 
speculation of political interference and further jeopardize the success of 
the tribunal by increasing opportunities for corruption and bias.222 
Moreover, clear standards differentiating private and public infor-
mation would not only encourage media reporting of the ECCC while 
ensuring the protection of serious confidentiality needs but would also 
provide a positive example for domestic courts. The current practice of 
disclosing information on a basis that lacks consistency or well-reasoned 
decisions only exacerbates the problems of corruption and secrecy 
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among domestic courts. Without clear standards at the ECCC, there is 
little incentive for domestic courts to provide for greater transparency. 
Absent transparency at both the ECCC and local courts, the public will 
continue to lose faith in the judiciary, and the legacy of the ECCC will be 
undermined. 
B. The ECCC Should Issue Clear Warnings When the Confidentiality of 
Investigations Has Been Breached 
Because the ECCC presumes that information during pretrial inves-
tigations is entirely confidential, it is imperative that the ECCC issue 
clear warnings or orders before imposing sanctions on journalists. The 
plain language of Rule 35(1)(a) itself requires that in order to find an in-
terference with the administration of justice, an individual must have dis-
closed “confidential information in violation of an order of the Co-
Investigating Judges or the Chambers.”223 
Although the ECCC does issue warnings to journalists enumerating 
what articles breached the confidentiality of judicial investigations, such 
orders fail to include any further explanation.224 The warnings do not 
disclose what information triggered the violation or why divulging such 
information was forbidden.225 The result is that journalists are forced to 
make difficult decisions that balance their professional obligations to 
keep the public informed with their own personal fears of being sanc-
tioned by the ECCC. Members of the press are thus dissuaded from re-
porting on important issues at the ECCC, which hinders the court’s goals 
of national reconciliation and serving as a model for the domestic Cam-
bodian system.226 The ECCC should therefore disclose what information 
triggered the violation of the investigation so as to ensure that sensitive 
material is protected but allow as much public access as possible. 
C. The ECCC Should Engage in a Case-by-Case Inquiry to Determine if 
an Interference with the Administration of Justice Occurred 
The vague standard of confidential document filings, coupled with 
the broad duty of confidentiality outlined in the ECCC Practice Direction 
and broad applicability of Rule 35 sanctions, warrants departure from the 
ICTY’s determination that violations of protective orders “as such” 
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amount to interference with the administration of justice. Rather, the pre-
sumption of confidential judicial investigations and the absence of ex-
press protective orders necessitates a case-by-case balancing test of the 
purported government interest and interference with freedom of expres-
sion. The case-by-case analysis should consider three factors: the mate-
riality of the interference, the legitimacy of the confidentiality need, and 
the intent of the journalist. 
1. Material Interference 
First, in its case-by-case approach, the ECCC should require a ma-
terial interference with the administration of justice before issuing sanc-
tions pursuant to Rule 35. While the ICTY’s departure from such a 
showing may be warranted because it issues clear, affirmative protective 
orders,227 the ECCC operates under different standards. Due to the fact 
that all information is presumed confidential, and a great deal of informa-
tion is already in the public domain, the ECCC should encourage public 
access to information by loosening restrictions on journalists. Because of 
the great uncertainty regarding what information is protected, anything 
less than a material violation is unfair to journalists who are acting as 
watchdogs of democracy in a country plagued with corruption. Enforcing 
sanctions without a material interference only amounts to the protection 
of confidential investigations absent a compelling reason and will only 
operate to further erode public opinion of the ECCC.228 
2. Legitimacy of the Confidentiality Provision 
Second, the ECCC should carefully consider the underlying nature 
of the information that warrants protection before deciding whether to 
infringe on freedom of expression, for national reconciliation cannot be 
realized without establishing the truth.229 The public has a strong interest 
in ECCC proceedings, and therefore, the ECCC should require that a le-
gitimate purpose outweigh the public’s interest in information before 
infringing on journalists’ freedom of expression. 
Requiring legitimate reasons for confidentiality provisions is im-
portant to ensure not only that the public receives adequate information 
but also that the ECCC is held in high regard and therefore supports—
and does not undermine—the public perception of the judiciary. As re-
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cently as September 2010, the United Nations Human Rights Council 
noted that in Cambodia, “[t]here does not seem to be a prop-
er . . . balance between safeguarding private reputation and making pub-
lic information concerning matters of public interest.230 The Cambodian 
government admitted that “the judiciary has not yet gained full confi-
dence from the public,”231 and Cambodian citizens have sought alterna-
tive methods of justice.232 Adopting a balancing test that considers the 
legitimacy of the protective interest would thus provide a good example 
to the domestic Cambodian courts that sanctions for breaches of confi-
dentiality should be implemented only when a legitimate confidentiality 
need exists. Absent public trust in the ECCC, the Cambodian people will 
continue to distrust the domestic judiciary, and the ECCC will not fully 
achieve its objective to leave a legacy of democratization. 
3. Intent of Journalists 
The ECCC should sanction only journalists who act with the intent 
to interfere with the administration of justice, and the mistake-of-fact 
defense should be available to journalists who mistakenly disclose confi-
dential information. In light of the absence of clear standards regarding 
the disclosure of information, broad duty of confidentiality, and the well-
known nature of many of the facts involved in the investigation, holding 
journalists responsible for their inadvertent disclosure of protected in-
formation would not only be unfair but it would also further the disincen-
tive to report on sensitive information. 
While in Hartmann the ICTY rejected a requirement of specific in-
tent to interfere with the administration of justice233 and failed to recog-
nize Hartmann’s mistake-of-fact defense,234 the procedural rules at the 
ECCC are far different from those at the ICTY. First, in most cases at the 
ICTY, individuals are put on greater notice that they have been exposed 
to confidential information because affirmative protective orders are is-
sued pursuant to Rules 69 and 53.235 With so much information already 
in the public domain, and in the absence of affirmative protective orders, 
the ECCC should require a greater showing of intent than that required at 
the ICTY to ensure that sanctions are issued only to those who did in fact 
knowingly interfere with the administration of justice. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
As the first hybrid court that is supported by the United Nations but 
operates completely within a domestic court system, the ECCC is uni-
quely poised to lead the international community as a model for justice 
and reconciliation. In serving as both a domestic model and means of 
national reconciliation, the ECCC has the potential to help eradicate cor-
ruption in Cambodia and contribute to the development of a legitimate, 
stable judiciary.236 
Yet, in order to fulfill its objectives and its mandate to provide 
transparent proceedings whenever possible, the ECCC must regularly 
provide the public with information. Inconsistent disclosures undermine 
the legitimacy of the court and further contribute to the deterioration of 
the domestic legal system. 
While the presumption of confidential judicial investigations is 
consistent with other civil law courts, it must not be abused. During the 
course of investigations that span months and include much information 
already in the public domain,237 citizens should not be deprived of vital 
information—nor should journalists be forced to speculate what informa-
tion is protected and what is not.238 Rather, the ECCC should operate 
under clear standards that govern the disclosure of information to reduce 
the number of inadvertent disclosures. If confidential information is re-
leased, the ECCC should issue clear warnings. Yet, the notice should not 
simply list the sources of leaked confidential information. Instead, the 
ECCC should make efforts to narrowly tailor the confidentiality meas-
ures so as to provide for as much public access as possible. Clear stan-
dards, coupled with specific notice of alleged breaches of confidentiality, 
will likely reduce the potential for the use of sanctions pursuant to Rule 
35. But if the opportunity to issue sanctions should arise, the ECCC 
should adopt a case-by-case test for contempt proceedings that departs 
from recent jurisprudence established in Hartmann. 
While the ICTY serves as a model for many international criminal 
tribunals, its most recent jurisprudence regarding journalists and con-
tempt is troubling. The sweeping provisions established most recently in 
Hartmann undermine the freedom of expression by unnecessarily pro-
tecting confidentiality provisions and rejecting the need for showings of 
material interference and specific intent. If applied at the ECCC, in the 
absence of express protective orders and where broad confidentiality 
provisions are coupled with equally broad duties of confidentiality,239 
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such standards would prove detrimental to the court’s success by hinder-
ing national reconciliation and undermining the legitimacy of the court in 
the eyes of the public. 
The balancing test established by the ECHR, which requires a 
showing of a legitimate interest in confidentiality, that the interest be a 
necessary infringement on freedom of expression, and that the interfe-
rence is proportionate considering the public interest, offers a more ap-
propriate standard to guide the development of ECCC case law. By using 
a case-by-case approach, the ECCC can ensure that journalists are not 
dissuaded from performing their vital functions of keeping the public 
informed. If these recommendations are adopted, the ECCC can continue 
to facilitate national reconciliation and ensure that the court serves as a 
model for the domestic Cambodian system by using transparent proceed-
ings that are legitimate in the eyes of those for whom the tribunal was 
established—the Cambodian people. 
 
